The essence of triangulation, be it political or directional, is positioning. A ship at sea can triangulate its position relative to other ships or landmarks. A politician can advantageously triangulate his position relative to other politicians.

Bill Clinton, under the tutelage of consultant Dick Morris, perfected the art of triangulation during his presidency, particularly after the Republicans won both chambers of Congress in 1994. That technique, by which Clinton seized a popular middle ground between the liberal congressional Democrats and the Newt Gingrich-led Republican conservatives, was spectacularly successful in 1996, when Clinton was easily re-elected. Clinton demonized the Republicans as ideologically extreme and the Democrats as ideologically irrelevant, effectively positioning himself as the "mainstream" candidate.

In Illinois, Governor Rod Blagojevich has embraced a somewhat similar political strategy, but it's one of "biangulation," not triangulation. There is no compelling need to demonize Illinois' Republicans, as their presence in Springfield and in the General Assembly borders on the irrelevant; as such, their conservative positions on issues can be ignored. Thus, he need only adopt a position contrary to the state's political establishment -- which happens to be the legislature's Democratic majority and the bulk of the statewide office holders. Blagojevich's recent comments about the legislature's "spending orgy," and his allusion to legislators acting like "drunken sailors," prompted great anger among his former colleagues.

"We waited 26 years to get a Democratic governor," said one Northwest Side state representative. "And now our governor is trying to make us Democrats look like the bad guys. That's stupid politics, and he's going to regret it."

But viewed through the prism of Blagojevich's well known presidential ambitions, it's smart politics. The new governor, taking over in 2003, had two options: Either work with the legislature's Democratic majority and build a record as a party leader or work against his party and build an image as an independent-minded reformer.

Blagojevich obviously has opted for the latter, concluding that by "biangulating" and thereby contradicting the desires of Democratic legislators and their leaders, and by criticizing and vetoing the budgets of state Democratic officials, he will position himself with the political mainstream. He is, for the short term. The General Assembly's liberal Democratic majority is not averse to a tax hike to close the state's projected $5 billion budget deficit; Blagojevich is averse to a tax increase, and he borrowed his way out of the 2003 fiscal year deficit.

Blagojevich, sounding like a Republican, has pledged not to raise the state income tax. The Democratic majority is averse to cutting the budget; Blagojevich insisted that they do so, but they restored many of his cuts. State officials wanted more money in their budgets; Blagojevich resisted and vetoed, but the legislature approved the hikes anyway. The Democratic legislative majority wanted no part of any "ethics reform" that would interfere with lobbyist contributions; Blagojevich wanted reform, and he got his bill passed. Blagojevich also promised to open the spigot of state patronage, awarding jobs to Democrats; this has not yet happened.

To say that Blaogjevich is well hated in Springfield would be an exaggeration  -- at least at this time. But he is not well liked by Democratic legislators, and he is increasingly disliked. "We would work with him, but he does not want to work with us," added the state representative.

Blagojevich's posturing as the anti-establishment governor is reminiscent of Democrat Dan Walker, the one-termer elected in 1972. Walker tried to triangulate himself between the legislature's Democrats, loyal to then-Mayor Richard J. Daley or to Chicago, and the legislature's Republican majority. Walker's game plan was to create an image as a "gutsy reformer," get re-elected in 1976, and run for president in 1980.

But Walker, while inflaming Daley and his loyalists, failed to build his own political machine, and he lost by a decisive 811,721-696,380 margin to Daley-backed Mike Howlett in the 1976 primary. In 1972 Walker upset the favored Paul Simon, then the lieutenant governor, by 724,133-678,965. So, over his term, the Democratic pro-Walker base declined slightly, by just under 30,000 votes, but the anti-Walker vote, spurred by Daley in Chicago, surged by more than 130,000 votes.

The Walker analogy doesn't yet apply to Blagojevich, since he has not politically alienated Chicago Mayor Rich Daley and is not trying to build his own political machine. In the 2002 primary Blagojevich got 457,197 votes (36.5 percent), topping Paul Vallas by just 25,469 votes, with Vallas getting 34.5 percent of the total and with Roland Burris finishing third with 29 percent. Less than half (213,028) of Blagojevich's statewide vote came from Cook County, and 137,120 of that came from Chicago, but the combined Vallas-Burris vote in Cook County was 534,354, and Vallas actually beat Blagojevich in Chicago. That means Blagojevich got only 28.5 of the primary vote in Cook County.

As governor, Blagojevich promised to "end the way" the state does its political business, but apparently that just means getting his face on TV and his name in the papers with irritating regularity. There is no doubt that Blagojevich is an energetic and charismatic governor. He's in a constant campaign mode. But if he expects to run for president in 2008, he needs to identify with some salient issues or themes. And, so far, his themes are: I don't raise taxes, and I'm not part of the tax-hiking, favor-peddling Springfield culture. Those themes won't win him a presidential nomination.

Of course, when Blagojevich seeks a second term in 2006, there will be no Mike Howlett-type kamikaze to challenge him. Attorney General Lisa Madigan and Comptroller Dan Hynes won't abort their careers by opposing him, and Daley is not sufficiently angry to encourage opposition. The prospects of beating Blagojevich in the 2006 primary are virtually nonexistent.

But if Blagojevich's consuming ambition is to be president, then what makes him think that Illinois Democrats such as Daley, House Speaker Mike Madigan and Secretary of State Jesse White (whose budget he tried to cut) will back him in 2008? Blagojevich is positioning himself as a fiscally conservative, socially liberal Democrat. But so, supposedly, is Howard Dean. These days, no Democrat is "fiscally liberal."

If Blagojevich is to seriously contest Hillary Rodham Clinton for his party's 2008 nomination, he'll need the solid backing of the Illinois delegation, but if he continues on his present course, it will be Clinton who will get that solid backing. What goes around, comes around, and a growing number of Illinois politicians are resolving to "do a Walker" on Hot Rod if the opportunity arises.

In local political developments, two unexpected exits are noteworthy:

47th Ward: After almost 36 years as ward Democratic committeeman, Ed Kelly is retiring. He beat his onetime protege, Alderman Gene Schulter, by just 80 votes in 2000, but his 2003 aldermanic candidate got creamed by Schulter. Kelly could not have beaten Schulter in a 2004 rematch, and Schulter now will win the committeeman's job unopposed.

Schulter's ascension typifies Daley's political world, in which the mayor rules the aldermen and the aldermen rule their wards. Those aldermen who back Daley get to pick their ward superintendent, get to claim credit for ward services and improvements, and get plenty of city workers dispatched to work for them in campaigns. Committeemen like Kelly, who are not aldermen, are irrelevant. All power flows through the aldermen.

1st Ward: Independent Manny Flores won a huge 2003 upset over incumbent Jesse Granato, a Daley ally. Flores then expected to do what every new alderman does: grab the Democratic ward committeeman's job, which was held by Granato.

But Daley had other ideas. Granato resigned in September as committeeman, and the Democratic Central Committee named U.S. Representative Luis Gutierrez as his replacement. Gutierrez formerly was the alderman and committeeman in the 26th Ward, but he now lives in the 1st Ward.

Flores could have beaten Granato, but he cannot beat Gutierrez. Also, Flores harbors ambitions of serving in the U.S. House after Gutierrez retires. So Flores, acknowledging that he is not ready for prime time, has astutely folded his bid for committeeman.